Regulatory behaviour under threat of court reversal: theory and evidence from the Swedish electricity market by Soderberg, Magnus et al.
Accepted Manuscript
Regulatory behaviour under threat of court reversal: theory and
evidence from the Swedish electricity market
Magnus Söderberg, Flavio M. Menezes, Miguel Santolino
PII: S0140-9883(18)30087-2
DOI: doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2018.03.006
Reference: ENEECO 3938
To appear in:
Received date: 15 September 2017
Revised date: 19 February 2018
Accepted date: 1 March 2018
Please cite this article as: Magnus Söderberg, Flavio M. Menezes, Miguel Santolino ,
Regulatory behaviour under threat of court reversal: theory and evidence from the Swedish
electricity market. The address for the corresponding author was captured as affiliation for
all authors. Please check if appropriate. Eneeco(2018), doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2018.03.006
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As
a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The
manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before
it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may
be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the
journal pertain.
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
1 
 
Regulatory behaviour under threat of court reversal: theory and 
evidence from the Swedish electricity market 
Magnus Söderberg a, b, Flavio M. Menezes
1
, c and Miguel Santolino d 
a MINES ParisTech, PSL Research University, CERNA – Centre d’Economie Industrielle, 60 Boulevard St 
Michel, 75006 Paris, France. 
b Energy Management Research Centre, University of Southern Denmark, Niels Bohrs vej 9, 6700 Esbjerg, 
Denmark. Email: mags@sam.sdu.dk 
c School of Economics, University of Queensland, St Lucia, Qld 4072, Australia. 
d Riskcenter-IREA, Department of Econometrics, University of Barcelona, Avda. Diagonal, 690, 08034 
Barcelona, Spain. E-mail: msantolino@ub.edu 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates how regulators influence outcomes in regulated markets when their decisions 
are subject to the threat of court review. We develop a theoretical model that provides a number of 
behavioural implications when (i) all regulators’ dislike having their decisions overturned by courts, 
(ii) inexperienced regulators care more about not having their decisions overturned than experienced 
regulators, and (iii) experienced regulators also care about consumer surplus. The theoretical 
implications are tested using a database of Swedish regulatory decisions from the electricity 
distribution sector. We provide empirical evidence that inexperienced regulators are more likely to set 
higher regulated prices than experienced regulators, and as the complexity of the case increases, there 
are on average more overturned decisions and higher prices for inexperienced regulators. The links 
between experience, complexity and regulatory outcomes are both statistically and economically 
significant. Simulations show that if those decisions that were not appealed had been appealed, then 
the court would have lowered the prices by 10% on average.  
Highlights 
 
 The purpose is to both theoretically and empirically investigate how regulators influence 
outcomes in regulated market when their decisions can be appealed.  
 The investigation controls for both regulator experience and case complexity.   
 The links between experience, complexity and regulatory outcomes are both statistically 
and economically significant.  
Key words: regulation, effort, complexity, experience 
 
JEL Classifications: K41, C34 
                                                          
1
Menezes acknowledges a senior research fellowship with the Australian Institute of Business and Economics. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article investigates the impact of regulators’ behaviour and their characteristics on outcomes in 
regulated markets.
2
 Two recent and general developments warrant the interest in this field. First, many 
industries that provide essential services (such as electricity, gas, telecommunications and 
water/sewerage) have been subject to unbundling of the competitive and natural monopoly segments 
of the industry and the privatisation and corporatisation of publicly owned enterprises. In the pre-
reform period, prices were often set in an opaque process controlled by the government/ministers and 
sometimes by the government-owned institutions providing the service. In the post-reform period, 
firm prices have been strongly influenced by regulators, making outcomes in these industries 
increasingly reliant on regulatory decisions (e.g. Jordana et al., 2011). 
 
Second, this development has coincided with a more general trend towards replacing judge-made law 
with regulators (Shleifer, 2012). A major reason for this change is the unpredictability of judges’ 
decisions. Gennaioli and Shleifer (2008) argue that such unpredictability arises partly from judges’ 
concerns related to the potential damage to their careers from having their decisions overturned by 
appellate courts. Regulators’ decisions, on the other hand, have been claimed to be more predictable 
and efficient given their relatively high level of expertise (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003). While greater 
predictability can provide a rationale for the rise of regulation, it does to some extent ignore the fact 
that regulators are also subject to their own motivations. For example, while regulators may desire to 
maximise society’s welfare, they also have other aspirations such as to be promoted within the 
government or to work for the industry in the future.
3
   
 
The ubiquity of regulation in modern economies raises a number of concerns. These include the lack 
of consistency in regulatory decisions (across time, industries or jurisdictions), political influence on 
the regulatory process via the appointment process for regulators and the career concerns of regulators 
                                                          
2
 The terms ‘bureaucrat’ and ‘regulator’ are often used interchangeably in the economics literature. However, in 
many jurisdictions regulators are independent from the bureaucracy and are instead established as an 
Independent Statutory Authority.  For this reason we use the term "regulator" throughout this article. 
3
 These motivational concerns can be traced back to Niskanen’s (1971) notion of public officials being inclined 
to maximise their budgets and Stigler’s (1971) proposition that regulators may become captured by the industry. 
More recently, Leaver (2009) provides evidence of a causal link between regulators’ levels of career concern and 
the extent to which their decisions are biased. In her sample of electricity rate reviews in the U.S. she finds that 
the length of office terms for regulators (with longer office terms being associated with less career concern) is 
negatively related to both the probability of initiating regulatory reviews and regulated prices. 
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who might favour consumers (with a view to being reappointed) or industry (with a view to securing 
future jobs). An increasing body of evidence examines regulatory decisions to identify the effects of 
these various factors. Examples of studies based on U.S. data include Davis and Muehlegger (2010), 
Leaver (2009), DeFigueiredo and Edwards (2007) and Knittel (2003). With the increasing availability 
of data elsewhere, there is also a new body of literature evaluating regulatory decisions outside the 
U.S., including Australia (Breunig and Menezes, 2012; Breunig, Hornby, Menezes and Stacey, 2006), 
Brazil (Silva, 2011) and Sweden (Smyth and Söderberg, 2010).  
 
The aim of this article is to investigate the behaviour of regulators when their decisions are subject to 
an external review by a court. Whereas regulatory decisions can always be challenged on legal 
grounds by the courts, the external review of regulatory decisions is a lively policy issue.
4
 Importantly, 
there has been no discussion on the impact of making regulatory decisions subject to external review 
on the behaviour of regulators. This article aims to fill this gap.  
 
A key premise of this article is that regulators do not like to see their decisions changed. This is 
because having one’s decisions overturned or changed can make it more difficult to be reappointed as 
a regulator or to secure career progression.
5
 Alternatively, this dislike may simply arise from a private 
wish to avoid mistakes or to avoid being seen as having made a mistake.
6
 In particular, in our 
benchmark model, we assume that regulators only care about not having their decisions changed. 
These regulators make decisions with the exclusive aim of minimising the likelihood that any mistakes 
will be exposed by the court. The possibility of regulatory mistakes being explicitly subjected to 
judicial review is a novel feature of our analysis and follows from the institutional setting we study, 
where both customers and regulated firms can appeal the regulator’s decisions. 
 
                                                          
4
 For example, in Australia, until recently regulatory decisions in electricity could be appealed on merit to the 
Australian Competition Tribunal. This raised concerns that regulated companies can cherry pick particular 
aspects of a decision. See, for example, Mountain and Littlechild (2010), Garnaut (2014) and Simshauser (2014). 
Limited merit review was abolished by legislation in October 2017  
5
 The premise that regulators’ decisions are influenced by self-interest is a dominant feature of the economic 
theory of regulation, and can be traced back to the seminal contributions of Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976) 
and Posner (1974).  
6
 Individuals’ tendency to dislike making errors (or to avoid regrets more generally) is a common assumption 
both in neuroscience (Coricelli et al., 2005) and in decision science (Reb and Connolly, 2009). 
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We then consider a regulator who cares both about not having her decisions changed by the court and 
about consumer surplus.
7
 We argue that more experienced regulators will have such characteristics. 
For inexperienced regulators, there is a risk that court reversals will be attributed to limited knowledge 
or ability, and may have a disproportional impact on their reputation. Reversals of decisions by 
experienced regulators, on the other hand, can be interpreted as the regulator and court having 
different views of the law.
8
 It is plausible, therefore, that inexperienced regulators have stronger 
incentives to avoid making ‘mistakes’ and that experienced regulators have greater opportunity to 
consider additional decision making objectives, such as consumer surplus,
9
 with less concern for 
appeals and the threat of court reversal.   
 
In our model decisions require different amounts of information. We denote a decisions that require 
much information as a complex decision. As a result, the regulator has to make a decision about how 
much effort to put into the investigation of a consumer’s complaint about the price set by the regulated 
firm to connect her to the electricity grid. The regulator’s decision of how much effort to exert is 
influenced by a number of parameters such as the cost of effort and the likelihood that the decision 
might be changed by an appellate court.  
 
The possibility of a regulator making a mistake arises in our model from the existence of asymmetric 
information; the regulated firm knows its true cost, but the regulator only knows the distribution from 
which the cost is generated. The regulator can discover the firm’s true cost by exerting costly effort. 
Once the regulator has chosen her level of effort, she decides what price to set. At this stage, both the 
customer and the firm may appeal to an administrative court under different scenarios. For example, a 
regulated firm will not appeal when a high price is set, and similarly, a consumer will not appeal when 
a low price is set, but both may appeal otherwise. In our model, the focus is on how the regulators’ 
decisions and their choice of effort are influenced by the possibility of appeal under different 
regulatory objectives. Finally, we assume that the court uncovers the firm’s true cost. This is of course 
                                                          
7
 The regulator’s focus on consumer surplus (rather than, for example, total welfare) is motivated by 
Prendergast’s (2007) model of bureaucratic bias. He shows that it is welfare improving for regulators to adopt 
pro-consumer preferences when customers have relatively higher stakes than firms.  Moreover, there has been 
much debate about consumers’ disadvantageous position and the need for the regulator to act as advocate for 
consumers in the empirical setting that we consider in this article.   
8
 Garside’s et al. (2013) provides strong empirical evidence, in the context of competition cases in the U.K, that 
more experienced bureaucrats attract more external criticism. This is consistent with the notion that more 
experienced bureaucrats may care less about having their decisions changed by the courts and, therefore, may 
make decisions that are different from those made by less experienced bureaucrats.  
9
 In Section 3.1 we provide empirical support for a link between experience and the type of objective.  
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an oversimplification, but our results will remain true in a qualitative sense as long as the court has a 
sufficiently high probability of uncovering the firm’s true cost.  
 
We emphasise that while the model is stylised and a few strong assumptions are made, our primary 
objective is to identify a number of economic factors from first principles that can guide the 
specification of a reduced form empirical model. While the nature of the data we collected does not 
allow us to estimate a structural model, it has informed the development of the theoretical model.  
 
Importantly, this theoretical framework allows us to make a number of testable predictions for 
different types of regulatory objective. Specifically, when the regulator is only concerned about not 
having her decision overturned, we show that, under certain conditions, a larger number of decisions 
will be overturned by the court when cases are more complex (i.e., cases requiring more effort for the 
regulator to make the ‘right’ decision) than in situations where the cases are less complex.  
 
We also show that when the regulator cares about both not having her decision overturned and 
consumer surplus, less complex cases will be associated with more appeals by regulated firms, but 
fewer decisions will be overturned and prices will be lower. As the complexity of the case increases, 
we predict a switch to more appeals by consumers, more decisions being overturned and higher prices 
on average.  
 
Moreover, regulators who care about both not having their decisions overturned and consumer surplus 
will exert less effort when cases become more complex. This emerges as, in equilibrium, parties 
recognise the link between complexity, choice of effort and outcomes.   
 
We empirically investigate customer complaints about the price set by firms for connecting a 
residential dwelling to the electricity network. Five regulators, employed as life-long civil servants at 
the Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate, have reviewed 293 complaints during the 2003-2009 period 
and 141 of those were appealed to the Special Administrative Court. A primary empirical challenge is 
that regulators’ experience is endogenous. We construct an instrument by mechanically assigning 
incoming complaints to the regulator with the lowest workload, and estimate 2SLS models.  
 
Most of our theoretical predictions are confirmed in the empirical investigation. The key conclusion is 
that regulators’ dislike of seeing their decisions overturned has an impact on regulatory decisions that 
is both statistically and economically significant.  Simulations show that if those decisions that were 
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not appealed had been appealed, the court would have lowered the prices by 10% on average. This 
value can be interpreted as a measure of the deviation from true costs for decisions that are not 
appealed and which could be reduced in various ways including by the appointment of experienced 
regulators.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model that highlights the role of 
regulatory preferences in identifying the interrelations between regulator objectives, the effort chosen 
by the regulator, the cost of effort and regulatory outcomes. Section 3 describes the regulatory setting 
in the Swedish electricity sector. Section 4 contains our empirical investigation and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
 
2. A THEORY OF REGULATORY BEHAVIOUR UNDER COURT REVIEW 
We assume there are two types of firms that differ based on unitised costs: high cost (𝑐𝐻) and low cost 
(𝑐𝐿), 𝑐𝐻 > 𝑐𝐿. The fraction of 𝑐𝐻 firms in the population is equal to 𝑞, whereas the fraction of 𝑐𝐿 firms 
is equal to 1 − 𝑞. We assume the following sequence of events. A firm sets the price to charge the 
consumer either at 𝑐𝐿 or at 𝑐𝐻. If the price is set at 𝑐𝐻, we assume that the consumer complains to the 
regulator,
10
 otherwise there are no further developments. Consumer demand is equal to 1 at a price less 
than or equal to 𝑐𝐻, and 0 otherwise. The firm is assumed to set 𝑝 = 𝑐𝐻 regardless of its cost. Clearly, 
it would set 𝑝 = 𝑐𝐻 when it is a high cost firm and, given that the firm is not penalised for any ambit 
claims, it will also choose 𝑝 = 𝑐𝐻 when it is low cost.  
 
When the regulator receives a complaint, it has to determine a regulated price, 𝑝𝑅. We assume that the 
regulator does not know the firm’s true cost, but they can find out the true cost by exerting some 
effort. Denote effort by 𝐸 = {0, 𝜀}. Let the cost of effort be given by 𝐶(𝐸) = 𝐸. If the regulator exerts 
effort 𝜀 > 0, they fully learn the true cost of the firm. By exerting 0 effort, the regulator assumes that 
any low cost firm will pretend to be a high cost. More precisely, if the regulator exerts 0 effort, then all 
they know is that the firm’s true cost is 𝑐𝐻 with probability 𝑞. These are obviously simplifications that 
are meant to capture some of the key characteristics of the regulatory process. An alternative 
formulation where higher effort would mean more accurate, but not perfect, information about the true 
costs of the regulated firm would lead to similar qualitative conclusions.  
                                                          
10
 Note that we could assume that the decision is probabilistic, but it will simply complicate matters without 
providing any additional insight.  
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Once the regulator has chosen their level of effort, they then decide what price to set. We assume that 
when they set 𝑝𝑅 = 𝑐𝐻, the consumer appeals to the court with probability 𝛾, and when the regulator 
sets 𝑝𝑅 = 𝑐𝐿, a high cost firm appeals to the court with probability 𝛿, where 𝛿 < 𝛾. The assumption 
𝛿 < 𝛾 captures the notion that while the interaction of the consumer with the court is a one-off, the 
regulated firm’s relationship with the court and the regulator is more complex, because it takes the 
form of a repeated game.
11
 It should be noted that while there are no explicit appeal costs imposed on 
either consumers or the firm in the model, the fact that both 𝛿 and 𝛾 can take values less than 1 could 
conceivably capture such costs. As indicated earlier, we assume that the court will uncover the true 
cost of the firm.  
 
Finally, the model considers each interaction between agents (e.g., between the consumer and the 
regulator or between the regulator and the courts) as a one-off. That is, although it is implicitly 
captured in the relationship between parties’ probabilities of appeal, we do not explicitly consider the 
role of reputation in this setting.
12
 While this is done again for simplicity and tractability, we 
conjecture that reputation building will be more important for inexperienced regulators and it might 
accentuate the difference in effort choices between them and experienced regulators, who are less 
concerned about having their decisions overturned by courts.   
 
2.1 Benchmark model 
Initially, we consider a regulator whose only concern is that the court does not overturn her decision. 
Here, we assume that the utility of the regulator when a decision is not overturned by the court is 
0U , and when her decision is overturned, the utility is equal to 0 . Proposition 1 summarises 
the regulator’s decision in this setting. 
 
                                                          
11
 Frequent appeals might tarnish a regulated company’s reputation — especially if the outcome of the appeal is 
unfavourable. This naturally results in regulated firms being more cautious when deciding to appeal. There are 
also costs associated with appealing and, in reality, there is some uncertainty about the court’s decision that is 
not considered in this model. This relationship is also expected based on Priest and Klein (1984), since 
consumers have higher stakes than utilities. This assumption is about the probability of appeal given a particular 
regulatory decision, whereas the summary data described in Table 1 is unconditional on the decisions.  
12
 For example, there is an economics literature that examines the role of reputation in dynamic games of 
incomplete information with a focus on sequential equilibrium. See Wilson (1985) for a survey and Camerer and 
Weigelt (1988) for experimental evidence suggesting that the notion of sequential equilibrium in dynamic 
incomplete information games describes actual behaviour well. 
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Proposition 1. Suppose 
 


q
q
1
.
13
 
 (1) 
That is, the ‘hazard rate’ is greater than the ratio of the probability of appeal by the consumer to that 
of the firm. Then for sufficiently high cost of effort, or more specifically, if   Uq)1( , the 
regulator always chooses 0 level of effort and sets H
R cp  . If   Uq)1( , then the regulator 
always chooses E  and sets R
Lp c  when she uncovers the firm is low-cost, and will set 
H
R cp  otherwise.  
 
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
 
The following corollary follows in a straightforward manner from Proposition 1 and provides some 
novel propositions that can be tested empirically.  
 
Corollary 2. When a regulator is only concerned about not having her decisions overturned and (1) 
holds, for a sufficiently high cost of effort (i.e., in more complex cases), Proposition 1 implies that 
more decisions will be overturned by the court than in the case of less complex cases. In particular, in 
the less complex case, effort will always be exerted, and the regulator always has an incentive to set 
Rp  equal to the true cost of the firm, thus no decisions will be overturned by the court.
    
 
 
2.2 An alternative objective for the regulator 
We now consider an alternative type of regulator who cares about both not having her decisions 
overturned and consumer surplus.
14
 In this setting, consumer surplus is simply equal to the difference 
between the consumer’s valuation and the cost of service provision. Proposition 3 establishes that, 
with this type of regulator, we should observe more appeals by the regulated firm and a larger number 
                                                          
13
 Total cost in industries that rely on a physical network is strongly related to population density, with high 
density leading to lower cost. During the sample period we consider (2002-2009) only 3% of the 290 Swedish 
municipalities had a population density above 1000 inhabitants per square km and 16% had a density above 100 
inhabitants per square km. Thus, condition (1) is plausible in our empirical setting.  
14
 In our empirical approach we postulate that less experienced regulators will care more about not having their 
decisions overturned than experienced regulators. It follows that we will characterise less experienced regulators 
as those who care only about not having their decisions overturned and more experienced regulators as those 
who care about both not having their decisions overturned and consumer surplus. 
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of overturned decisions. In addition, such a regulator will choose a lower regulated price than a 
regulator who cares only about not having her decisions overturned. 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that 
?̅? > −Γ +
(1 − 𝑞)(1 − 𝛾) + 𝑞(1 − 𝛿)(𝑐𝐻 − 𝑐𝐿)
−(1 − 𝑞)𝛾 + 𝛿𝑞
                             (2) 
.
  
Then, under the assumptions of the model, a low cost of effort will be associated with more appeals by 
the regulated firms but fewer decisions being overturned and lower prices. Conversely, as the cost of 
effort increases, we predict a switch to more appeals by consumers and more decisions being 
overturned.  
 
Proof. See Appendix 1.  
 
Condition (2) is likely to hold when the disutility cost for the regulator is low and when the probability 
that utilities appeal is high. Proposition 3 suggests that as the cost of effort increases (for example, in 
more complicated cases), the regulator switches to 0 effort and sets H
R cp  . Thus, we predict that 
less complex cases will be associated with more appeals by regulated firms but fewer decisions being 
overturned and lower prices. Conversely, as the complexity of the case increases, we predict a switch 
to more appeals by consumers, more decisions being overturned and higher prices on average. The 
following corollary follows in a straightforward manner from this analysis. 
 
Corollary 4. Suppose   )(1 LH ccU 

 and condition (2) are both satisfied. Then, whenever 
positive effort is exerted, the regulator sets L
R cp   independently of the realisation of costs. This 
will lead to the court overturning the regulator’s decision upon an appeal by the regulated firm, but no 
appeals will be made by consumers.  
 
The theoretical model developed above provides a number of testable implications: (i) regulators set 
lower prices when cases are uncomplicated; (ii) when regulators care about both  not having their 
decisions overturned and consumer surplus they generally set lower prices than when they only care 
about not having their decisions overturned; (iii) regulators who care about both not having their 
decisions overturned and consumer surplus are more likely to respond to complexity by lowering 
effort, implying higher prices on average; (iv) when regulators only care about not having their 
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decisions overturned and when cases are complex, the court reduces the regulator’s chosen price; (v) 
when regulators care about both not having their decisions overturned and consumer surplus and when 
cases are less complex, the court sets the same price as the regulator; and (vi) when regulators care 
about both not having their decisions overturned and consumer surplus and when cases are complex, 
more decisions are overturned by the courts.  Understanding the implications of the regulators’ 
decisions to exert low or high levels of effort and the regulators’ and court’s price setting decisions is 
particularly relevant from a policy perspective.  
 
 
3. CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS IN THE SWEDISH ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
In the Swedish electricity distribution sector, customers can file complaints to the national energy 
regulator, the Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate (EMI), regarding the contract conditions (e.g., the 
price for connecting to the network) set by the local monopolistic firms that own the networks. Based 
on its review of the monopolist’s charges, the regulator either confirms the conditions in full or 
mandates that the distribution company reduce the price it has charged the consumer.  
 
The ‘regulator’ is the individual who chairs the review and is responsible for making the final decision 
on the consumer’s complaint. This regulator is a civil servant employed by the EMI and appointed by 
the Director-General (DG) to resolve disputes. The DG is appointed by the national parliament and 
has no official party affiliation. At each point in time there is a pool of individuals available as 
regulators that the DG can choose from. There are no clear guidelines on how individuals are 
appointed as regulators but data reveals that up until 2005 the DG applied a rotating policy where 
regulators served in spells of 3 reviews on average whereas the average spell increased to almost 23 
reviews in the 2006-2009 period. This increase in the number of consecutive reviews undertaken by 
regulators coincided with an organisational change in which a customer complaint unit was 
established. Although, in principle, the DG can still decide who will serve as regulator, it has been 
customary that reviews are chaired by the head of this new unit. When a civil servant’s role as 
regulator ends, she is assigned to other duties within the organisation, such as to set distribution 
charges, provide customer advice, conduct market research or engage in international regulatory 
collaborations. Customer complaint data is suitable as a basis for studying the impact of economic 
incentives since it is only as the chair of complaint reviews that civil servants act in their own names; 
complaint decisions are signed by the chair whereas other regulatory decisions such as distribution 
charge decisions are made in the name of the regulatory organisation.  
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A regulator’s decision is subject to appeal; either the customer or the firm can appeal the regulator’s 
decision to the Special Administrative Court (the ‘court’). The court then decides whether to confirm 
the price determined by the regulator, or to change it in favour of the appellant. There is only one 
court reviewing appealed regulatory decisions.  
 
In practice, customers complain about a range of different aspects of their electricity supply and about 
different contract conditions.
15
 Here, we focus solely on disputes that arise when customers complain 
about the price quoted by firms for connecting an electricity consuming ‘unit’ to the existing network. 
This focus on connections to understand regulators’ behaviour is justifiable as connection cost drivers 
are well understood and measureable, and the regulator has used a transparent method to determine the 
maximum allowed price throughout the sample period we consider. This method is explained below.  
 
Connection to the electricity network can be classified based on the type and ownership of the unit 
being connected: residential dwellings, industrial and other buildings, and connections of mobile 
towers. This distinction arises naturally as households and corporations have different locational 
preferences: residential customers tend to choose locations in close proximity to other households and 
social services whereas industrial customers are typically located within industrial areas with easy 
access to infrastructure. Mobile towers are associated with very distinct locational choices as they are 
exclusively placed on the top of large buildings and on hills or mountains. These preference 
differences affect connection characteristics and they may also have an impact on unobserved 
characteristics that influence regulators’ decisions. Hence, we restrict our investigation to complaints 
by residential customers. 
 
We now describe the review process itself. When reviewing complaints, the regulator first determines 
whether the connecting customer is located in an urban or a rural area. In urban, built-up areas, the 
regulator applies a homogenous price regardless of the particular circumstances of the connection. In 
rural areas, however, the regulator allows the monopolist to charge a higher connection price so that 
the firm can recover the higher fixed costs associated with new lines, transformers and other 
extraordinary costs.
16
  
 
                                                          
15
 See Smyth and Soderberg (2010) for a comprehensive list of different complaints filed by Swedish electricity 
customers.  
16
 Examples of extraordinary costs are restoration of road surface and drainage of underground waterways.  
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The fixed cost for rural connections includes 60 metres of low voltage line, which implies that 
customers who are located within 60 metres of the existing network pay the same price. When more 
than 60 metres of line is needed, the firm can also charge a fixed price per metre of extra line. The 
metre cost is determined by the regulator and is based on the average of historical costs reported by 
firms to the regulator. For lines exceeding 560 metres, the regulator assumes that high voltage lines 
are needed and it therefore grants a higher metre cost for that part of the connection. In certain 
situations the firms may also add the cost of transformers. Specifically, when connections require less 
than 560 meters of new line, the regulator determines the need to use a transformer based on 
engineering principles and for line extensions exceeding 560 metres the firm is always granted the cost 
of a transformer.
17 
Our empirical approach, expounded in Section 4, is based on this regulatory 
framework.  
 
Connecting a new residential dwelling to the existing network always involves extending the existing 
network. This extension, however, will often (partly) benefit other units already connected. The 
principle used by the regulator to allocate these common costs is that a connecting unit should only 
pay for the part of the infrastructure that is specific to its need. If, for example, a new connection 
requires 100 metres of line extension and one transformer and half of the line length is used by another 
unit, then the new customer should pay the full cost of the 50 meters that is specific to her, the full 
cost of the transformer but only half of the cost of the remaining 50 meters of line.  
 
While the model for determining the maximum allowed price is in principle a simple one, determining 
the number of customers sharing particular line sections, transformers etc., is a complex task. The 
more units being affected by a new connection, the more complex and time consuming the review is. 
In our econometric investigation, we use number of connected units affected by the new connection as 
a measure of how complex the review is. We argue that this is a more suitable measure than what has 
been used previously in the empirical literature on judicial decisions. For example, Kaheny et al. 
(2008) used the number of document pages of the decision to represent complexity. The problems 
with this proxy are that different writers use different writing styles and background information 
included in judicial decisions is sometimes merely copied from earlier cases. Clermont and Eisenberg 
(2002) use review time as a proxy for complexity, but review time can be affected by several factors 
unrelated to complexity (e.g. regulatory experience/ability, available budget, and room for legal 
                                                          
17
 It is unusual that the regulator allows the firm to charge customers for extraordinary costs, but we evaluated all 
models with the extraordinary costs also included. This did not affect the results. 
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discretion). Since the number of affected customers is based on engineering principles and can be 
challenged by both firms and customers in court, it will be less prone to subjective influences that may 
cause endogeneity concerns. It should be noted that our measure only captures one aspect of 
engineering complexity; other aspects of complexity can be relevant, such as the quality of the 
information received from firms and customers.    
 
3.1 Data 
There are 293 observations covering the decisions made by regulators from the 1
st
 of January 2002 to 
the 31
st
 of December 2009.
18
 Information about each case is drawn from the case files provided by the 
Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate (EMI). Additional information was collected from annual 
regulatory statistics (also collected from the EMI) and firms’ annual reports. Descriptive statistics for 
all variables are given in Table A2.1 in Appendix 2.  
 
The regulator withheld a proportion of the firms’ claims in as many as 80 per cent of the 293 reviews. 
The average ratio of the amount awarded by the regulator (𝑃𝑅) to the firms’ claim (𝑃𝐹) is 0.767. Table 
1 shows that customers have appealed 17.7 per cent of the regulator’s decisions, while firms have 
appealed 30.4 per cent, resulting in almost half of the regulator’s decisions being appealed.19 The court 
reversed 19.3 percent of decisions appealed by firms and 24.5 percent of decisions appealed by 
customers. It is evident that court decisions exhibit substantial case level heterogeneity, but the 
average adjustments are small, amounting to a 2% reduction when customers appeal and a 1% 
increase when firms appeal.   
 
 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Prior to 2002 case files did not include all relevant information, e.g. line length required to connect the 
dwelling, and in February 2010 the regulatory model was fundamentally changed. The new model is still under 
review by the court, which precludes the use of more recent cases.    
19
 This data does not contradict our assumption that the probability of appeal by high cost firms is lower than the 
probability of appeal by consumers who respond to a high price. The data simply reflects that the real-world 
probability of appeal by all firms is greater than the probability of appeal by all consumers.  
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Nine regulators reviewed connections of residential dwellings during the 2002-2009 period. Three of 
the regulators chaired only three or fewer reviews and one chaired 8 reviews. We denote these as 
‘incidental regulators’ and exclude them from the empirical investigation. The remaining five are 
included in the sample and the characteristics for each one are summarised in Table 2.  
 
 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
 
Regulators’ experience is measured by the number of chaired reviews. No regulator has experience 
characteristics that are clearly different from the others and line length statistics indicate that 
regulators have been exposed to similar cases. On average, regulators have also made similar pricing 
decisions but it should be noted that experience and the reduction of firms’ prices are positively 
correlated. This gives support to our assumption that experience and focus on consumer surplus are 
positively related. Each regulator chaired reviews over 1-5 years and the overlap is limited. To reduce 
this heterogeneity we add both regulator and year fixed effects in all estimations. The regulator fixed 
effects serve the purpose of controlling for all time-invariant private and institutional 
preferences/abilities and the year fixed effects control for energy tax adjustments and other 
institutional changes such as the change in tariff regulation that occurred in 2008.  
 
 
4. EVIDENCE 
In Section 4.1, we explain the main empirical problem, i.e. that regulator experience is endogenous 
and how it is tackled. Section 4.2 investigates the prices set by regulators and Section 4.3 contains the 
analyses of the court’s price decisions. Finally, Section 4.4 simulates regulatory and court outcomes 
for different levels of experience and complexity and closely investigates the consistency between the 
theoretical predictions from Section 2 and the empirical findings.  
 
4.1 Overcoming Endogeneity  
One of the main empirical challenges is that a regulator’s experience can be endogenous. This can 
occur because regulators who set lower prices are more likely to stay longer as chairs, and/or that 
experienced regulators might be assigned to more complex cases.  
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This potential endogeneity has to be addressed since the price established by the regulator is included 
in the dependent variable in all models we estimate. More specifically, policy-makers have expressed 
concerns that consumers are in an unfavourable position in the electricity distribution sector and that 
their position needs to be strengthened (see Smyth and Söderberg, 2010, for details). This can lead the 
DG to select regulators with a high share of decisions favouring consumers. Indeed, Smyth and 
Söderberg (2010), who investigated all customer complaints (i.e., not just complaints about the 
connection of residential dwellings), found that the share of past decisions in favour of customers 
tends to be positively correlated with experience. There have also been concerns about the 
disproportionally high share of legal resources used to resolve regulatory disputes. Regulators who 
avoid appeals may therefore be preferred by the DG. 
 
To circumvent this endogeneity problem we follow Garside et al. (2013) and construct an instrument 
based on the principle that incoming complaints are mechanically assigned to the regulator with the 
lowest workload. Although we have no specific information about how cases are actually assigned 
among available regulators, we assume that workload is a determining factor. This construction 
eliminates all factors influencing the assignment of new cases, except workload, and thus, it will be 
completely exogenous in relation to the outcome of the reviews. It should be noted that the 
construction of the instrument does not consider actual workload since it is designed in a purely 
mechanical fashion. When calculating `the workload for each available regulator we control for the 
proportion of work that remains for each of the (mechanically assigned) cases currently under review. 
This is done by dividing the number of remaining days by the total number of review days for each 
case. At each point in time we observe the pool of available regulators and can therefore assign a new 
case to the regulator with the lowest workload. To calculate the share of remaining time we use the 
actual duration of each review.  
 
4.2 Regulator’s price setting 
According to theoretical predictions (i)-(iii) at the end of Section 2, the regulator’s price decision will 
be influenced by her level of experience (NoRev), case complexity (Complex) and the interaction 
between them. The dependent variable is formulated as 
𝑃𝑅
𝑃𝐹
. Taking the ratio of these two prices has the 
advantage of eliminating the influence of basic cost factors that are accepted by all agents. Examples 
of such factors are the use of (different types of) transformers and the amount of power.   
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Furthermore, we control for the regulatory framework described in Section 3 by adding the following 
variables: (i) an indicator for whether the connection is in an urban area (Urban), (ii) indicators for 
whether the connection requires less than 60 metres or more than 560 metres of line length, 
respectively (𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠60 and 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔560), and (iii) total line length (𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑜𝑡). We also add 
variables indicating whether the firm is one of the three largest in the market (ThreeLar),
20
 and the 
number of relevant court precedents (NoPrec). ThreeLar controls for the possibility that the larger 
firms have a greater ability to influence regulatory outcomes and NoPrec controls for the amount of 
information the regulator has to collect and the degree of discretion that she has given the binding 
legal positions determined in previous cases. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics are 
provided in Table A2.1 in Appendix 2.  
 
Hence, the model we use to explain regulators’ price decisions is formulated as: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑅
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝐹  = 𝛽1𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠60𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔560𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽
5
𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑜𝑡
𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽
6
𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑜𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝐓𝑡𝛄𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
  (3) 
 
where i is regulator and t is a case number representing the chronological order in which decisions are 
made.
21
 𝐓𝑡 is a vector of time fixed effects; 𝜃𝑖 is the regulator fixed effect and 𝜀𝑖 is the random error 
term.
22
 We estimate (3) using homoscedastic-consistent SEs. These SEs are preferred over SEs 
clustered over regulators since we only have five regulators and clustered SEs are known to be biased 
downward when there are few clusters (Nichols and Schaffer, 2007). White’s robust SEs were 
evaluated and were generally similar to the SEs that are reported. To test for a specific form of within-
correlation we estimate a dynamic panel data model using the approach developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). Correlation between adjacent reviews can occur if regulators bring insights or focus 
from a recently closed case to a new one. However, we find no evidence of such correlation.
23
 
                                                          
20
 The Swedish local electricity distribution market is dominated by three firms that in 2009 had a combined 
market share of 49%.  
21
 We also experimented with various transformations of continuous variables, e.g. log-transformations, but 
those models did not improve the fit between the model and the data.   
22
 In Section 3 we described that the DG might have changed the way she assigned regulators in 2006. To 
evaluate if this potential change affects the results we also estimate all models where observations prior to 2006 
are excluded. All those results are very similar to those reported in Tables 3 and 4.  
23
 Results are available from the authors upon request.  
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Moreover, we estimate (3) when NoRev is included also as a squared term. Considering that NoRev 
covers a wide range of different experience levels, ranging from 1 to 95
24
, it is possible that its 
relationship with 
𝑃𝑅
𝑃𝐹
 is non-linear. As a result, we also relax the linearity assumption.  
 
Results for both linear and non-linear models are presented in columns (1) and (2) in Table 3. By and 
large, the results are consistent with the theoretical relationship between regulator’s experience and 
case complexity and the regulatory decisions. It also suggests that larger firms are treated somewhat 
differently by the regulatory process. This could be because large firms operate their networks 
differently or because they are more experienced with the regulatory process. Table 3 also shows that 
including the squared 𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣-term does not improve the fit between the model and data.  
 
It is also noteworthy that the impact of complexity changes across the different models. This shows 
that there is strong support for higher experience reducing the price set by regulators when cases are 
relatively simple. As case complexity increases, regulators reduce the price less, or even accept firms’ 
prices in full. However, a more precise understanding of how experience and complexity affect the 
regulator’s decision can be gained by simulating the outcome for different values of NoRev and 
Complex. We perform such simulations in Section 4.4 where we also scrutinise the consistency 
between the theoretical predictions and empirical results more closely.  
 
 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
 
 
The analysis above has assumed that NoRev is exogenous. Next we relax this assumption by making 
use of the instrument described in Section 3. The instrument for NoRev×Complex is created by 
                                                          
24
 One should note that while the maximum number of decisions in our sample is 88, the maximum number of 
decisions by a single regulator is 95. This difference is due to the existence of a number of decisions for which 
we do not have all the information that were excluded from our estimation but were counted towards the 
regulators’ experience. 
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multiplying the mechanically constructed instrument for NoRev by Complex. When using the 
specification in (3), i.e. without 𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣2 and 𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣2 × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥, we use the instrument both in 
level and squared and create interactions between both these variables and the instrument. When 
𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣2 and 𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣2 × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 are added to (3), we maintain the idea that the endogenous variable 
can be explained by higher-order polynomial expansions of the instruments and thus, we also include 
the cubic form of the instrument as a main effect and interacted with Complex. In addition to allowing 
for a more flexible correlation structure between the instrument and the endogenous variable (i.e. the 
possibility of a non-linear relationship), this approach also allows us to perform an over-identification 
test.   
 
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3 display the results where NoRev is assumed to be endogenous and 
where we replicate the four assumptions regarding specification and data sample that we used in the 
exogenous case. First-stage results are provided in Appendix 3, Table A3.1. When we apply this 
instrumentation strategy the first stage F-statistic for the endogenous variables is clearly above 10 (a 
common rule-of-thumb) in column (3), and slightly below 10 in column (4). The overidentification 
test is strongly supported in both cases. The results suggest that relaxing the exogeneity assumption 
has no qualitative impact on the estimates. However, as expected, the IV-estimations reduce  
efficiency. To minimise the risk of bias we consider the results in column (3) to be our preferred 
results.  
 
4.3 Court’s price setting 
As in section 4.2, we eliminate basic cost drivers by defining the dependent variable as the ratio of the 
amount awarded by the court (𝑃𝐶) and the regulator (𝑃𝑅). We then estimate the following model:  
 
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝑅
 = 𝛽
1
𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠60𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔560𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽
5
𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑜𝑡
𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽
6
𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑜𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝐓𝑡𝛄𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
  (4) 
 
where notations are as in (3). It should be noted that there is only one court reviewing decisions made 
by the EMI regulators and we do not have access to information about which judges participated in the 
reviews/decisions. Thus, no court fixed effects are included.  
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We perform the same tests of robustness regarding specification, sample and estimation as in Section 
4.2
25
  
 
 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 
 
It should be noted that the first-stage F-statistic indicates that instruments are weak in column (4) so 
we treat those results as suggestive. The empirical results by and large suggest that the impact of 
NoRev and Complex on court decisions are negative and that the impact of 𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣 × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 is 
positive. These findings are consistent with predictions (iv)-(vi) but formal tests require that the main 
and interaction effects are evaluated simultaneously (see Section 4.4).  
 
Nevertheless, the results in Table 4 suggest a number of relevant conclusions. First, both NoRev and 
Complex appear to be non-linearly related to the outcome. Second, there is a larger difference between 
results when NoRev is assumed to be exogenous and when it is endogenous compared to the 
regulators’ decisions, indicating more serious endogeneity concerns in this case. This implies that the 
OLS estimates in Table 4 are likely to suffer from larger biases than those displayed in Table 3.  
 
4.4 Consistency between theory and evidence 
In this section we calculate predicted values of eqs. (3) and (4) for different levels of regulator 
experience and case complexity. This allows us to calculate net effects including interactions and 
square terms, which are not intuitive when inspecting the results visually.   
 
                                                          
25
 One potential problem with the appealed cases is that they might not be a random sample, thus violating one 
of the fundamental regression assumptions. Non-randomness can occur if, for example, firms with more 
financial and legal resources are more likely to appeal, if firms or customers have time-varying expectations 
about the court (such as who is serving as judge) or if firms and customers are more likely to appeal cases that 
involve larger charges. We attempted to control for this potential non-randomness by using Heckman’s 2-step 
and maximum likelihood estimators. However, results were uninformative due to low level of statistical 
efficiency.  
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Predicted values of 
𝑃𝑅
𝑃𝐹
 based on estimates in column (3) of Table 3 are presented in Table 5. Here we 
use the following combinations of values: 𝑁𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣 = {5, 30, 60} and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 = {1, 3, 5, 7}. While 
our sample contains values of NoRev varying from 1 to 95 and Complex varying from 1 to 11, we 
restrict the simulations to the maximum value of the interaction between them. We are cautious about 
evaluating out-of-sample predictions since some of the specifications include squared terms that easily 
produce absurd outcomes when input values are extrapolated.  
 
Our theoretical prediction (i) states that regulators set lower prices when cases are relatively 
uncomplicated. Our results for both inexperienced and more experienced regulators are indeed 
consistent with this prediction.  Predictions (ii) and (iii) postulate that experienced regulators set lower 
prices and respond more strongly to complexity, i.e. that they increase the price at a higher rate as 
complexity increases. Both those predictions are also confirmed.  
 
 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
 
 
When calculating predictions of 
𝑃𝐶
𝑃𝑅
 we also restrict maximum input values based on the maximum of 
the interaction between NoRev and Complex, conditioned on appealed cases. The two first theoretical 
predictions regarding the court’s decisions are: (iv) when regulators are inexperienced and when cases 
are complex, the court reduces the regulator’s price, and (v) when regulators are experienced and 
when cases are relatively simple, the court sets the same price as the regulator. These predictions are 
confirmed when using both the linear and non-linear versions of eq. (4). The last theoretical prediction 
says that the court increases the regulator’s price when the regulator is experienced and when the case 
is complex. Here we observe distinctly different outcomes when using the linear and the non-linear 
specifications. The linear specification suggests that the court reduces the price, whereas the non-
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linear specification gives the opposite result. It is easy to argue in favour the non-linear specification 
given that all NoRev and Complex terms are significant at least at the 5% level in both non-linear 
models. Taking a cautious stand, we can at least conclude that there are good indications for 
consistency between theory and data.  
 
Eq (4) also allows us to simulate final prices if all regulatory decisions had been appealed. It turns out 
that the court would have lowered prices for the non-appealed decisions by approximately 10% on 
average, if those decisions had been appealed. This casts doubts on the view held by many 
practitioners that regulators are biased in favour of the consumers. Instead, it seems more likely that 
regulators are influenced by other objectives, such as error minimisation.   
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This article postulates that regulators dislike their decisions being overturned by courts and explores 
the consequences of such dislike for regulatory outcomes. Our results show that there is a strong 
relationship between the theoretical predictions and the results from the reduced form estimations. 
 
In particular, our empirical results based on regulatory decision in the electricity distribution section in 
Sweden suggest that regulators set lower prices when cases are relatively uncomplicated. We have 
also provided empirical evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that experienced regulators set 
lower prices and respond more strongly to complexity, i.e. that they increase the price at a higher rate 
as complexity increases. Moreover, we have shown empirically that when regulators are inexperienced 
and when cases are complex, the court reduces the regulator’s price, and that when regulators are 
experienced and when cases are relatively simple, the court sets the same price as the regulator. The 
only theoretical proposition that we partly fail to support empirically is the prediction that the court 
would increase the regulator’s price when the regulator is experienced and when the case is complex.  
 
Overall, our key contribution is to provide both a simple theoretical model and supporting empirical 
evidence, that the nature of the regulators’ preferences and behaviour can have a number of 
consequences for regulatory outcomes. This evidence argues in support of promoting positive models 
of regulatory economics, where emphasis is placed on how regulators, as individuals, interact with the 
regulatory framework. This ought to complement the normative models that determine what regulators 
should do in order to maximise social welfare.  
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Our contribution has also implications for broad energy policy. In particular, it may inform the choice 
of regulator, or the choice of objectives to be pursued by the regulator. For example, in circumstances 
where the electricity sector is characterised by over-capitalisation, the government may favour the 
appointment of experienced regulators, and consumers over the regulated firm. Conversely, when the 
electricity sector is characterised by underinvestment, the government may seek to appoint regulators 
that are less likely to be biased towards consumers, leading to less legal appeals, greater regulatory 
certainty, and higher investment levels.  
Further research is needed to increase our understanding of how regulators behave. For example, 
regulators and firms are often engaged in repeated games so empirical investigations examining this 
dynamic aspect is potentially very relevant.  
Appendix 1 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
First, we calculate the regulator’s expected utility conditional on effort. Then, we determine the 
optimal level of effort and the associated regulated price. For E , the regulator fully uncovers the 
regulated firm’s true cost. In this case, if the regulator uncovers Hc , and sets the regulated price 
Rp  
equal to Hc , then she obtains utility:  
 
    UcEcpU HHR ,| . 
 
In this case, the consumer appeals to the court with probability  . However, the court does not 
reverse the regulator’s decision. If instead the regulator sets L
R cp  , she obtains utility: 
 
    UcEcpU HLR )1()(,| . 
 
In this case, the regulated firm appeals to the court with probability   and the court reverses the 
decision. Note that    HLRHHR cEcpUcEcpU ,|,|   . If instead, the regulator 
uncovers Lc , then her utility under the two possible prices is equal to: 
 
    UcEcpU LHR )1()(,|  
 
and 
 
    UcEcpU LLR ,| . 
 
Note that    LHRLLR cEcpUcEcpU ,|,|   . 
 
We now look at the case where the regulator chooses 0E  and, as such, does not know the true 
realised costs and so computes her expected utility as follows: 
 
   UqUqEcpU HR )1()()1(0|    
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and 
 
   UqUqEcpU LR )1()()1(0|   . 
 
Note that    0|0|  EcpUEcpU HRLR  if 1qq   . 
 
Finally, note that for 



q
q
1
, the regulator chooses effort 0E  if 
 
    UqqqU )1()1)(1( .  
 
That is, the regulator chooses 0E  and H
R cp   when 



q
q
1
 and  
 
(1 ) ( )q U    . 
■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
For E , we can calculate the regulator’s expected utility when Hc  is realised as follows: 
 
    UcEcpU HHRCS ,|  
 
and 
 
    ))(1()(,| LHHLRCS ccUcEcpU . 
 
Note that    HLRCSHHRCS cEcpUcEcpU ,|,|    if 
 


 )(
1
LH ccU


. 
 
This inequality holds, for example, whenever the probability that the regulated high cost firm appeals 
following a regulatory decision, where L
R cp  , is sufficiently close to one. Conversely, the 
inequality is unlikely to hold if   is small or if the consumer surplus is large. 
 
Similarly, if 𝑐𝐿 is realised, then the regulator’s expected utility is given by: 
 
| , ( ( )) (1 )( )CS R H L H LU p c E c c c U             . 
 
That is, in this case, the consumer appeals to the court with probability   and the court overturns the 
regulator’s decision and the price is reduced to Lc . Similarly, 
 
    UcccEcpU LHLLRCS )(,| . 
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Note that if the regulator chooses E , then she will set L
R cp  when the firm is of a low cost 
type. 
 
We now consider the case where 0E  and compute the regulator’s expected utility as follows: 
 
   UccqUqEcpU LHHRCS )1())(()1(0|    
 
and 
 
𝑈𝐶𝑆[𝑝𝑅 = 𝑐𝐿⌊𝐸 = 0] = 𝑞[𝛿(−Γ) + (1 − 𝛿)(?̅? + 𝑐𝐻 − 𝑐𝐿)]+(1 − 𝑞)(?̅? + 𝑐𝐻 − 𝑐𝐿). 
 
 
When 0E , the regulator sets H
R cp   whenever 
 
?̅? > −Γ +
(1 − 𝑞)(1 − 𝛾) + 𝑞(1 − 𝛿)(𝑐𝐻 − 𝑐𝐿)
−(1 − 𝑞)𝛾 + 𝛿𝑞
                             (2) 
 
and this inequality does not always hold as long as 



q
q
1
. (Since we need the denominator to be 
positive so that the sign won’t change when we divide the inequality by it). Finally, whenever (2) is 
satisfied, the regulator will choose effort   (and L
R cp  ) over 0 effort (and H
R cp  ) whenever 
 
 UccqUqUcc LHLH )1())(()1()(    
 
or 
 
   Uqqcc LH   )1()1(1)( . 
■ 
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Appendix 2. 
 
Table A2.1. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Description No. of 
obs. 
Mean S.D. Min Max 
NoRev Number of reviews chaired by regulator. 293 39.365 25.362 1 95 
Complex Number of customers affected by a connection.  293 2.0424 1.9786 1 11 
LegnLess60 Indicator for when total line length is shorter 
than 60 metres. 
293 0.2730 0.4463 0 1 
LengLong560 Indicator for when total line length is longer 
than 560 metres.  
293 0.1911 0.3939 0 1 
LengTot Total line length (metres) 293 320.82 414.04 0 3500 
Urban Indicator for when connection is in urban area 293 0.1741 0.3798 0 1 
ThreeLar Indicator for when firm is one of three largest 
(Vattenfall, E.On, Fortum). 
293 0.6109 0.4884 0 1 
NoPrec Number of previous decisions made by the 
court. 
293 87.577 80.917 1 189 
CustCorp Indicator for when customer is corporation. 293 0.4164 0.4938 0 1 
𝑃𝐹 Amount claimed by firm (SEK). 293 88 497 118733 8 960 1 348 187 
𝑃𝑅 Amount awarded by regulator (SEK). 293 64 828 77 852 6 981 696 812 
𝑃𝐶  Amount awarded by court (SEK). 141 75 117 86 463 6 981 696 812 
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Appendix 3. 
 
This Appendix contains first stage results when eqs. (3) and (4) are estimated using 2SLS. 
 
Table A3.1. First-stage results of eq (3), using 2SLS. Main results are presented in Table 3.  
 Main results 
in column 
(3) 
  Main results 
in column 
(3) 
  Main results 
in column 
(4) 
  Main results 
in column 
(4) 
  Main results 
in column 
(4) 
  Main results 
in column 
(4) 
 
Variable                  
Dep. Var. NoRev   NoRev ×
 Complex 
  NoRev   NoRev2   NoRev ×
 Complex 
  NoRev2 ×
 Complex 
 
Complex 2.07444 
(1.33785) 
  44.337 
(2.86534) 
***  2.77996 
(1.59055) 
*  165.815 
(157.734) 
  53.5348 
(3.25038) 
***  2584.57 
(229.494) 
*** 
LengLess60 2.96403 
(2.61626) 
  4.62247 
(5.60338) 
  2.77218 
(2.51848) 
  118.676 
(249.757) 
  2.67190 
(5.14666) 
  226.638 
(363.383) 
 
LengLong560 -3.07656 
(3.73756) 
  -8.08917 
(8.00491) 
  -2.06037 
(3.62597) 
  -413.976 
(359.586) 
  -0.98689 
(7.40988) 
  -494.700 
(523.178) 
 
LengTot 0.00279) 
()0.00374) 
  0.00669 
(0.00801) 
  0.00267 
(0.00361) 
  0.40771 
(0.35833) 
  0.00303 
(0.00738) 
  0.47001 
(0.52135) 
 
Urban -1.26731 
(2.88102) 
  -3.29791 
(6.17043) 
  -0.63043 
(2.76969) 
  26.2159 
(274.669) 
  -2.07280 
(5.66001) 
  -21.3988 
(399.628) 
 
ThreeLar 0.79020 
(2.16951) 
  -10.545 
(4.64654) 
**  1.85016 
(2.10050) 
  310.653 
(208.306) 
  -6.65805 
(4.29249) 
  -164.177 
(303.073) 
 
NoPrec 0.86241 
(0.20425 
***  1.44920 
(0.43743) 
***  0.62440 
(0.20320) 
***  28.2746 
(20.1513) 
  0.66372 
(0.41525) 
  16.2133 
(29.3190) 
 
Mech_NoRev 0.96647 
(0.18868) 
***  3.68395 
(0.40411) 
***  1.68988 
(0.37961) 
***  192.393 
(37.6461) 
***  4.82431 
(0.77576) 
***  361.842 
(54.7730) 
*** 
Mech_ NoRev2 -0.00074 
(0.00125) 
  -0.02184 
(0.00269) 
***  -0.01635 
(0.00723) 
**  -2.60503 
(0.71747) 
***  -0.04912 
(0.01478) 
***  -3.84471 
(1.04388) 
*** 
Mech_ NoRev3       0.00008 
(0.00004) 
**  0.01372 
(0.00366) 
***  0.00016 
(0.00008) 
**  0.01288 
(0.00532) 
** 
Mech_NoRev ×
 Complex 
-0.10105 
(0.05138) 
**  -1.45666 
(0.11004) 
***  -0.19397 
(0.11630) 
*  -12.4396 
(11.5334) 
  -2.46385 
(0.23766) 
***  -102.852 
(16.7804) 
*** 
Mech_NoRev2 ×
 Complex 
0.00073 
(0.00040) 
*  0.01458 
(0.00086) 
***  0.00246 
(0.00234) 
  0.15685 
(0.23225) 
  0.03636 
(0.00479) 
***  1.00402 
(0.33791) 
*** 
Mech_NoRev3 ×
 Complex 
      -8.1e-6 
(0.00001) 
  -0.00050 
(0.00127) 
  -0.00012 
(0.00003) 
***  0.00041 
(0.00184) 
 
                  
Regulator FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
                  
R2 0.658   0.821   0.608   0.550   0.838   0.820  
No obs 293   293   293   293   293   293  
Notes. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. Default standard errors (SE) are in brackets.  
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Table A3.2. First-stage results of eq (4), using 2SLS. Main results are presented in Table 4.  
 Main results 
in column 
(3) 
  Main results 
in column 
(3) 
  Main results 
in column 
(4) 
  Main results 
in column 
(4) 
  Main results 
in column 
(4) 
  Main results 
in column 
(4) 
 
Variable                  
Dep. Var. NoRev   NoRev ×
 Complex 
  NoRev   NoRev2   NoRev ×
 Complex 
  NoRev2 ×
 Complex 
 
Complex 2.40545 
(5.79445) 
  71.8653 
(7.24443) 
***  9.38043 
(14.42993) 
  1195.28 
(1394.01) 
  66.6474 
(16.7188) 
***  4568.26 
(1537.20) 
*** 
LengLess60 3.26386 
(5.29928) 
  8.63302 
(6.62535) 
  2.72816 
(5.31295) 
  37.1375 
(513.26) 
  6.98615 
(6.15568) 
  352.290 
(565.982) 
 
LengLong560 -4.16178 
(5.98844) 
  -1.43546 
(7.48697) 
  -5.56272 
(5.94390) 
  -872.499 
(574.213) 
  -4.94982 
(6.88670) 
  -885.977 
(633.196) 
 
LengTot 0.00609) 
()0.00573) 
  0.00193 
(0.00716) 
  0.00840 
(0.00576) 
  1.00988 
(0.55645) 
*  0.00907 
(0.00667) 
  1.10480 
(0.61361) 
 
Urban -1.06577 
(5.85219) 
  -1.61938 
(7.31662) 
  0.07879 
(5.86599) 
  84.1668 
(566.687) 
  -0.90629 
(6.79644) 
  40.7550 
(624.897) 
 
ThreeLar 0.66865 
(3.59065) 
  -0.58046 
(4.48916) 
  -0.24437 
(3.56174) 
  165.612 
(344.083) 
  -1.28049 
(4.12669) 
  113.832 
(379.427) 
 
NoPrec 0.17481 
(0.43816 
  0.26563 
(0.54781) 
  -0.10357 
(0.45306) 
  -42.556 
(43.768) 
  -0.22862 
(0.52492) 
  -54.9830 
(48.2636) 
 
Mech_NoRev 1.17195 
(0.19161) 
***  2.24223 
(0.23955) 
***  4.24717 
(2.14375) 
**  416.304 
(207.098) 
**  6.09903 
(2.48378) 
**  602.518 
(228.371) 
*** 
Mech_ NoRev2       -0.10430 
(0.08029) 
  -10.7287 
(7.75657) 
  -0.19842 
(0.09303) 
**  -19.6184 
(8.5533) 
** 
Mech_ NoRev3       0.00102 
(0.00083) 
  0.10762 
(0.08002) 
  0.00237 
(0.00096) 
**  0.22452 
(0.08824) 
** 
Mech_NoRev ×
 Complex 
-0.09935 
(0.14456) 
  -1.00632 
(0.18073) 
***  -1.85381 
(2.00333) 
  -243.432 
(193.532) 
  -3.78323 
(2.32109) 
  -435.682 
(213.412) 
** 
Mech_NoRev2 ×
 Complex 
      0.08074 
(0.07855) 
  9.81136 
(7.58883) 
  0.18301 
(0.09102) 
**  19.3100 
(8.36836) 
** 
Mech_NoRev3 ×
 Complex 
      -0.00092 
(0.00083) 
  -0.10476 
(0.07979) 
  -0.00233 
(0.00096) 
**  -0.22574 
(0.08799) 
** 
                  
Regulator FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
                  
R2 0.458   0.668   0.493   0.461   0.734   0.572  
No obs 141   141   141   141   141   141  
Notes. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. Default standard errors (SE) are in brackets.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for appeals and court responses. 
 
 Share of regulatory 
decisions appealed
 
Share of appeals reversed 
by court  
𝑷𝑪 𝑷𝑹⁄  
Appeals made by customers 0.177 0.245 0.979 
(0.608-0.979) 
Appeals made by firms 0.304 0.193 1.008 
(1.008-1.1534) 
All appeals 0.478 0.220 0.993 
(0.608-1.1534) 
Sample: 293 customer complaints about prices set by firms for connecting residential dwellings. Ranges for 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝑅⁄  are given 
in brackets.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for each regulator. 
 
 Regulator 1
 
Regulator 2 Regulator 3 Regulator 4 Regulator 5 
No of observations in 
sample 
33 88 37 47 88 
Years decisions were 
made 
2008-2009 2007 2007 2003-2007 2009 
Average level of 
experience (SD) 
18.7 
(10.6) 
47.6 
(27.4) 
19.3 
(11.3) 
44.7 
(20.4) 
44.5 
(25.5) 
Average 𝑃𝑅 𝑃𝐹⁄  (SD) 0.89 
(0.14) 
0.74 
(0.20) 
0.77 
(0.18) 
0.73 
(0.24) 
0.76 
(0.19) 
Average line length (SD) 346 
(375) 
350 
(440) 
343 
(403) 
414 
(402) 
223 
(402) 
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Table 3. Results when using 𝑷𝑹 𝑷𝑭⁄  as depentent variable.  
Variable OLS   OLS   2SLS   2SLS  
 (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
NoRev -0.00431 
(0.00053) 
***  -0.00259 
(0.00207) 
  -0.00391 
(0.00082) 
***  0.00373 
(0.00504) 
 
NoRev2    -0.00001 
(0.00002) 
     -0.00008 
(0.00005) 
 
Complex 0.01702 
(0.00710) 
**  0.01376 
(0.00849) 
  0.02375 
(0.00830) 
***  0.02844 
(0.01226) 
** 
NoRev × Complex 0.00105 
(0.00019) 
***  0.00198 
(0.00074) 
***  0.00078 
(0.00026) 
***  0.00079 
(0.00109) 
 
NoRev2 × Complex    -0.00002 
(0.00001) 
     -2.7e-6 
(0.00001) 
 
LengLess60 0.02389 
(0.02503) 
  0.01999 
(0.02519) 
  0.02351 
(0.02518) 
  0.00884 
(0.02690) 
 
LengLong560 0.03079 
(0.03551) 
  0.02981 
(0.03587) 
  0.03532 
(0.03563) 
  0.01854 
(0.03808) 
 
LengTot 0.00005 
(0.00004) 
  0.00005 
(0.00004) 
  0.00005 
(0.00004) 
  0.00006 
(0.00004) 
 
Urban -0.01142 
(0.02777) 
  -0.01086 
(0.02776) 
  -0.01306 
(0.02784) 
  -0.00662 
(0.02839) 
 
ThreeLar -0.04177 
(0.02095) 
**  -0.03774 
(0.02098) 
*  -0.04566 
(0.02109) 
**  -0.03790 
(0.02168) 
* 
NoPrec 0.00138 
(0.00311) 
  -0.00083 
(0.00321) 
  0.00124 
(0.00207) 
  -0.00170 
(0.00255) 
 
            
Regulator FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
            
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat       46.917   8.308  
Overidentification test (p-value)       0.176   0.602  
R2 0.467   0.449   0.463   0.429  
No obs 293   293   293   293  
Notes. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. Homoscedastic-consistent standard errors (SE) are in brackets.   
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Table 4. Results when using 𝑷𝑪 𝑷𝑹⁄  as depentent variable. 
 OLS   OLS   2SLS   2SLS  
Variable (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
NoRev -0.00017 
(0.00042) 
  -0.00456 
(0.00199) 
**  -0.00151 
(0.00063) 
**  -0.01912 
(0.00626) 
*** 
NoRev2    0.00007 
(0.00003) 
**     0.00029 
(0.00009) 
*** 
Complex -0.05704 
(0.01360) 
***  -0.08614 
(0.01829) 
***  -0.09393 
(0.01719) 
***  -0.15727 
(0.03346) 
*** 
NoRev × Complex 0.00011 
(0.00032) 
  0.00391 
(0.00167) 
**  0.00108 
(0.00042) 
***  0.01520 
(0.00436) 
*** 
NoRev2 × Complex    -0.00006 
(0.00003) 
**     -0.00025 
(0.00007) 
*** 
LengLess60 -0.00555 
(0.01311) 
  -0.00254 
(0.01296) 
  -0.00612 
(0.01355) 
  0.01426 
(0.01816) 
 
LengLong560 0.01123 
(0.01466) 
  0.00796 
(0.01460) 
  -0.00029 
(0.01542) 
  0.01165 
(0.02055) 
 
LengTot -5.7e-6 
(0.00001) 
  -2.6e-6 
(0.00001) 
  0.00001 
(0.00002) 
  -5.1e-6 
(0.00002) 
 
Urban -0.00677 
(0.01470) 
  -0.00425 
(0.01446) 
  -0.00701 
(0.01487) 
  -0.00111 
(0.01775) 
 
ThreeLar -0.00963 
(0.00882) 
  -0.00905 
(0.00872) 
  -0.00543 
(0.00918) 
  -0.01262 
(0.01174) 
 
NoPrec 0.00062 
(0.00357) 
  0.00128 
(0.00362) 
  0.00180 
(0.00113) 
  0.00213 
(0.00174) 
 
            
Regulator FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
            
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat       28.702   1.532  
Overidentification test (p-value)       Exactly ident.   0.124  
R2 0.418   0.400   0.329   0.106  
No obs 141   141   141   141  
Notes. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. Homoscedastic-consistent standard errors (SE) are in brackets.  
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Table 5. Price-setting by regulator based on results in column (3) in Table 3.  
Complexity 𝑷𝑹 𝑷𝑭⁄  when 
regulator has 
chaired 5 reviews 
𝑷𝑹 𝑷𝑭⁄  when 
regulator has 
chaired 30 reviews 
𝑷𝑹 𝑷𝑭⁄  when 
regulator has 
chaired 60 reviews 
1 0.8266 
(0.0277) 
0.7483 
(0.0131) 
0.6545 
(0.0172) 
3 0.8824 
(0.0231) 
0.8426 
(0.0120) 
0.7949 
(0.0202) 
5 0.9383 
(0.0281) 
0.9369 
(0.0190) 
0.9353 
(0.0361) 
7 0.9941 
(0.0391) 
1.0312 
(0.0287) 
1.0757 
(0.0545) 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are calculated using the Delta method.  
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Table 6. Price-setting by court based on results in columns (3) and (4) in Table 4.  
 Based on column (3) in Table 4 Based on column (4) in Table 4 
Complexity 𝑷𝑪 𝑷𝑹⁄  when 
regulator has 
chaired 5 reviews 
𝑷𝑪 𝑷𝑹⁄  when 
regulator has 
chaired 30 reviews 
𝑷𝑪 𝑷𝑹⁄  when 
regulator has 
chaired 5 reviews 
𝑷𝑪 𝑷𝑹⁄  when 
regulator has 
chaired 30 reviews 
1 1.0244 
(0.0136) 
1.0137 
(0.0059) 
1.0446 
(0.0390) 
0.9854 
(0.0200) 
3 0.8473 
(0.0290) 
0.8906 
(0.0140) 
0.8697 
(0.0416) 
1.1415 
(0.0763) 
5 0.6703 
(0.0599) 
0.7676 
(0.0296) 
0.6949 
(0.0704) 
1.2975 
(0.1591) 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are calculated using the Delta method. 
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